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INTRODUCTION
Our paper examines the impact of the financial and economic
crisis of 2008–2009 on the issuance of sovereign government
securities in the markets of Hungary and other emerging
countries. The financial and economic crisis which developed
in the wake of the default of Lehman Brothers resulted, with
an almost immediate impact, in a steep decline in investors’
risk appetite and drastically tightening liquidity in financial
markets. The subsequent spillover of the crisis into the real
economy not only set off an easing in monetary conditions in
most countries, but also led to the adoption of major fiscal
stimulus measures. As a result, a large number of developed
and emerging countries have been forced in recent months to
issue government securities in large quantities.
From the demand side, two factors should be highlighted
given the crucial impact they had on investors’ government
paper purchases in the period following September 2008.
The  dramatic decline in risk appetite prompted investors
worldwide to shift preferences from higher-risk instruments
(shares, corporate bonds, government bonds of emerging
markets) to the government securities issued by developed
countries. This process was intensified by the crowding-out
effect
1 stemming from the increased issuance of government
securities in developed markets in the wake of the fiscal
stimulus measures which were adopted. While the financial
market developments observed in the past six months suggest
that the extremely low levels of risk appetite are not likely to
persist, the financing requirement of developed-country
governments of may in fact divert funds from higher-risk
issuers. Accordingly, it would be worthwhile to explore the
extent to which demand for high-risk government papers has
been influenced in recent months by the high level of risk
aversion and by the crowding-out effect of bond issuances in
the developed markets.
In our paper we first present global bond issuance processes,
in particular, the supply of various issuer types. Secondly, we
analyse the sovereign bond issuance
2 of emerging countries in
This paper focuses on the impact of the financial and economic crisis of 2008–2009 on the issuance of sovereign debt in the
Central and Eastern European region and other developing countries. As a result of the fiscal rescue packages, the financing
requirement of both developed and emerging countries has increased significantly since 2007, giving rise to substantial changes
in risk appetite as well as considerable shifts in demand for the securities of various issuers operating in the global bond markets.
During the most severe period of the crisis, only countries with the best credit ratings were able to obtain substantial amounts
of funds, while less developed or emerging economies had limited options. In particular, shrinking borrowing opportunities
translated into rising yields, weak auction demand and hence unsuccessful auctions. While the market turmoil did not spare
less developed euro area countries either; these developments had a particularly negative impact on the government securities
markets in the Central and Eastern European region. Although improving risk appetite prompted a parallel rebound in emerging
sovereign bond markets, heightened competition for the shrinking financing resources raised the cost of funds in higher-risk
economies considerably. Our findings show that – besides developments in risk appetite – demand for the sovereign bonds of
emerging countries was also influenced by the crowding-out effect generated by the increased issuance of government papers in
developed markets. 
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in sovereign bond issuance in the Central and
Eastern European region after the Lehman
collapse*
* The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the offical view ot the Magyar Nemzeti Bank.
1 In the classical economic interpretation, the crowding-out effect means that an increase in government spending tends to divert savings – through a higher rate of
return – from the financing of firms’ investment projects. In our paper, however, the crowding-out effect is interpreted somewhat differently in that we set out to
examine whether American, British, Japanese, etc. government bonds – which are deemed lower risk and are issued in large quantities – crowd out the government
bonds or corporate bonds of developing markets from the market.
2 Sovereign bonds are government paper, which are issued in international bond markets rather than the issuer country’s domestic market and are denominated in the
foreign currency of a developed country (US dollar, euro, Swiss franc, etc.) rather than the domestic currency.global markets, and then compare the yield spreads of these
issues before and after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers as
well as the factors affecting those spreads. Lastly, we
summarise our conclusions with respect to the characteristics
of sovereign bond issuance following the collapse of Lehman
Brothers. In addition, we provide a brief overview of the
tensions prevailing, particularly in the third quarter of 2008
and the first quarter of 2009, in the markets of government
bonds issued in domestic currency, and demonstrate how
issuer behaviours changed in response to the tensions. The
analysis focuses mainly on developments in the primary
market without attempting to identify the factors shaping
yields in the secondary markets.
RECENT TRENDS IN BOND ISSUANCE IN
GLOBAL MARKETS
The global bond market is essentially comprised of
government bonds, bonds issued by financial and non-
financial corporations, as well as MBS and ABS securities.
3
According to IMF estimates, at the end of 2008 the total
bond portfolio amounted to USD 80-85 trillion. 40 per cent
of the portfolio consists of government bonds denominated
in domestic currency and foreign currencies, while 60 per
cent is comprised of corporate bonds. Securities issued by
financial corporations represent 80 per cent of the latter.
Only rough estimates are available regarding the MBS and
ABS segment: as of the end of 2007 the stock of these
securities amounted to USD 13 trillion. As regards risk
composition, 80 per cent of the government bond portfolio
is comprised of bonds rated AAA and AA, 17 per cent is
comprised of bonds rated A and BBB, while speculative-grade
bonds account for the remaining 3 per cent.
The fiscal stimulus and bank rescue packages introduced in
response to the intensification of the financial market crisis
and its spillover into the real economy resulted in a steep rise
in central government financing requirements in several
developed and emerging countries. According to OECD
estimates, the gross bond issuance of member states increased
by around USD 1 trillion in 2008 and, subject to further
growth, the gross financing requirement may be close to USD
12 trillion in 2009 with the net financing requirement rising
to USD 2.6 trillion (Chart 1). The issuance of North
American and euro-area countries accounts for the largest
part of this growth.
Turning to emerging markets, the growth rate of gross
issuance can be considered relatively moderate in their case,
but their net financing requirement is expected to increase
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Source: OECD.
* OECD forecast.
2007 Gross (%) 2008 Gross (%) 2009 Gross* (%) 2008 Net (%) 2009 Net* (%)
North America 67.78 64.43 64.03 80.06 72.37
Eurozone 14.64 17.31 18.45 10.25 11.77
Other Europe 2.62 4.26 4.63 11.98 13.03
Asia and Pacific OECD 13.18 12.39 11.20 –3.15 1.91
Emerging markets OECD 1.78 1.61 1.68 0.86 0.92
Total 100 100 100 100 100
Table 1
Composition of sovereign issues by region
3 I.e. mortgage-backed securities and asset-backed securities.
Chart 1
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* OECD forecast.faster than the OECD average (71.2% vs. 61.5%), thus the
affected countries will have to reach a proportionately higher
level of borrowing (Table 1).
As the financing requirement has increased in all regions and
the issuance of several member states is expected to soar to a
historical high in the coming period, issuers will continue to
face fierce competition and rising cost of funds as they
attempt to obtain borrowing. At the same time, the yield-
increasing effect of a supply boost may be offset or delayed –
at least partly and temporarily – by the following factors:
• sustained low inflation expectations resulting from the real
economic downturn;
•  increasing demand for safe, liquid assets (including
government papers) in the context of high risk aversion;
• low central bank base rates;
• yield-suppressing effect of the asset purchase programmes
and quantitative easing;
•  enhanced central bank liquidity-providing operations,
which drive up demand for government papers as they are
eligible collaterals.
However, this seemingly positive picture should be refined
further. First, the items identified above as factors putting
downward pressure on yields, affect different sovereign
issuers to widely varying degrees. Obviously, they exert the
strongest impact on the most developed countries, while
emerging economies fall significantly behind in several
aspects. The central banks that were able to achieve a base
rate close to zero (Fed, ECB, Bank of England, Bank of
Japan) are mainly found in developed countries, while a high
level of external vulnerability and the threat of potential
speculative attacks inhibited the execution of substantial
interest rate cuts in many emerging countries (including
Hungary, Romania and Russia).
Investors’ flight to safe, liquid assets primarily increased
demand for US and German government paper, while in this
regard the government bonds of emerging countries were
broadly perceived as being on par with any other high-risk
assets. The government securities of Central and Eastern
European emerging markets suffered a further disadvantage
vis-à-vis those of euro-area countries, as they are not included
in the ECB’s list of eligible collaterals. The highest volumes
of asset purchase programmes relative to market size were
recorded in the USA, Japan and the United Kingdom, whilst
the central banks of emerging countries had less opportunity
to take advantage of this option.
On the other hand, more subdued risk aversion and the
recovery in economic growth erode the yield-suppressing
effects described above both in developed and emerging
countries. Indeed, effects pointing to yield increases are
expected to dominate over the long run, in particular,
mounting inflation expectations.
Strong reliance on scarce financing resources called for
pronounced changes in financing strategies as well. Issuance
is now characterised by a more flexible and opportunistic
approach worldwide. Instead of anchoring borrowing to
long-term financing plans, debt managers now often disclose
issuance plans on very short notice, and decide on announced
quantities, maturities etc. on the basis of current market
developments.
4 The high level of uncertainty about financing
requirements also justifies this approach, as upside risks
continue to surround both growth prospects and the
robustness of private sector demand and thereby the necessity
of maintaining the economic stimulus packages.
In terms of maturity, short-term securities have typically
gained importance.
5 With a view to approaching broader
investor segments and large, non-resident institutional
investors, road shows have sprung up. At the same time,
while developed countries were typically able to (or forced
to) rely more strongly on non-resident investors, emerging
countries – which are broadly perceived as being higher-risk
– were practically driven out of international capital markets
during the most severe period of the crisis (see below). With
respect to financing, the contribution of domestic
institutional investors (pension funds, insurance corporations
and investment funds) has increased, most notably on
account of their stable demand for long-term securities
(Dalla–Hesse, 2009; Blommestein–Gok, 2009).
In the months following the intensification of the crisis,
competition between sovereign issuers was further fuelled by a
substantially increased supply of bank bonds backed by state
guarantees.
6 It should be noted that these instruments were
previously popular forms of investment and financing until the
turnaround in investor sentiment following the London
summit of the G20 in the spring of 2009, whereas subsequent
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4 A typical example of this was the gradual resumption of bond issuance in Hungary.
5 Pre-crisis experiences suggest that countries with higher financing requirements tend to rely more strongly on the issuance of short-term securities even under
normal market conditions, than those with a more stable fiscal position.
6 In April 2009, the total value of government guarantees in OECD countries was close to USD 1 trillion (Blommestein–Gok, 2009).months saw declining issuance volumes, and this trend is
expected to continue in the coming period. Factors both on the
demand side and the supply side contributed to this decline:
from the spring of 2009, in the context of improved global
market sentiment, investors shifted to high-risk, high-return
assets, thereby raising demand for bank bonds. In addition,
against the backdrop of significantly deteriorating CDS
spreads
7 and the recovery in unsecured bond markets and
unsecured senior bond issuance, banks reduced their recourse
to expensive state guarantees in response to the lower
financing costs available in these markets.
Examining bond issuance from the aspect of issuer types
clearly reveals the marked changes generated by the crisis.
While these changes have been apparent since mid-2008, the
most spectacular turn took place, “obviously”, in the last
quarter of 2008. At that point, the previously stable net
issuance volumes of financial institutions fell sharply (looking
at issuances in the domestic market alone, they turned negative
during the last quarter of 2008, and even in the first quarter of
2009 they barely climbed back into the positive range). By
contrast, sovereign issuers – whose supply had been relatively
low until then – clearly dominated bond issuances after the
second half of 2008. As we apply a breakdown by credit rating
it is also evident that primarily the most developed, “risk-free”
countries were capable of obtaining substantial borrowing, i.e.
countries with AAA or AA credit ratings, while less risk-free,
yet investment-grade countries – mainly emerging countries –
had rather limited possibilities (Chart 2). Developments in net
issuance confirm that in the last quarter of 2008 and the first
quarter of 2009 the sovereign issuance of less developed
economies was strongly constrained by a climate of high risk
aversion as well as the crowding-out effect of bonds issued by
developed countries.
Although, due to lags between the availability of data, it is not
reflected in the previous data series, as risk appetite
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7The fee payable by the buyer of the protection under a credit default swap contract.
Chart 2































































































Sovereign risk-free Sovereign investment grade
Financial institutions Corporate issuers
Source: BIS Quarterly Review, September 2009.
Note: the sovereign risk-free category is comprised of countries with AAA
and AA credit ratings, while countries rated A and BBB are classified in the
sovereign investment grade category. The chart indicates the consolidated
value of domestic and international market issuance.
Source: IIF.
* IIF estimate.
2007 2008 2009* 2010*
Private flows 1,252.2 649.1 348.6 671.8
Latin America 228.9 132.4 99.8 150.9
Emerging Europa 445.7 270.1 20.4 179.3
Africa/Middle East 155.4 75.3 37.4 68.7
Emerging Asia 422.2 171.2 191.1 272.9
Official flows 42.9 55.5 63.6 43.4
Latin America 6.3 14.5 22.2 14.7
Emerging Europa 4.2 20.9 39.4 16.8
Africa/Middle East 3.7 1.5 1.9 5.6
Emerging Asia 28.6 18.5 0 6.3
Table 2
Net capital inflows to emerging economies by region
(billion USD)improved, investors turned to emerging markets with
renewed interest. While capital inflow to emerging markets is
expected to fall significantly behind the values recorded in
previous years, following substantial outflows in the period
between October 2008 and March 2009, notable capital
inflows were observed in the second quarter of 2009, and the
earlier levels may be reached as early as 2010 (IIF, 2009).
8
Investment in debt securities has largely contributed to the
turnaround in capital flows, which partly reflects the fact that
the low interest rate environment of developed markets is
expected to persist, and hence carry-trade activities,
9 which
take advantage of interest rate differences, have picked up
once again. Given that emerging countries are considered to
be net capital exporters at the aggregate level (in this context
China plays an increasingly important role), capital flows
between emerging economies have gained significance as
well. However, there are notable differences between specific
regions: the largest growth in capital inflows was observed
mainly in the South-East Asian region, while the Central and
Eastern European region – which suffered the largest
downturn in the fourth quarter of 2008 and the first quarter
of 2009 – has recorded a significantly smaller share in this
growth thus far (Table2).
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8 Capital inflow to emerging economies reached USD 1.25 trillion in 2007 and USD 650 billion in 2008 and, according to the IIF’s October 2009 estimates, a net private
capital inflow of around USD 350 billion and USD 670 billion is expected for 2009 and 2010, respectively.
9 A foreign currency speculative strategy taking advantage of the interest rate differences between foreign currencies.
10 For better comparison, rather than taking the average value of the government securities issuance of specific states, we presented, for the period between January
2007 and September 2009, the relative differences from the monthly average values in proportion to the deviation.
11The Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Turkey.
12 MTS (Multilateral Trading System) is the most widely used electronic trading platform, which records the largest turnover in the international government securities
market.
The increasingly difficult borrowing conditions in autumn 2008 were
reflected in weak auction demand for domestic market issuance, as well
as failed, postponed or suspended auctions and rising yields. In
particular, the Central and Eastern European region faced severe
liquidity problems, while the market turmoil did not spare less
developed euro-area countries either.
Yields soared in the Czech, Polish, Hungarian and Romanian
government securities markets, while auction demand fell steeply and
secondary market turnover deteriorated. In October, a large number of
auctions had to be postponed or executed with reduced amounts. The
third quarter of 2008 saw a significant decline in bond issuance in
Central and Eastern European countries (Chart 3). In the period
following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, Hungary’s total issuance
amounted to merely the equivalent of EUR 100 million, while this value
was EUR 1.7 billion in Turkey, EUR 0.3 billion in Romania and EUR 2.3
billion in Poland. In the third quarter of 2008, the countries in the
region
11 issued government bonds in the amount of EUR 4.4 billion in
total compared to the EUR 8.5 billion gross issuance recorded in the
previous quarter for the same countries.
Debt managers typically adjusted to the downturn in demand in two
different ways: in response to rising yields and falling demand, they
either reduced or suspended issuance in most countries. By contrast,
despite high yield levels, they proceeded with auctions in Romania and
Turkey, but the amount allocated was significantly lower than before. As
a result, auctions in those countries were executed with substantial
overquotes. Implementation of this strategy was facilitated by strong
domestic demand for government securities on the one hand, and the
relatively inexpensive foreign currency funds made available under the
IMF programmes.
In the first quarter of 2009, long-term government securities issuance
reached a record low in the region: total borrowing amounted to merely
EUR 3.8 billion. Against declining turnover, bid-ask spreads have
widened considerably in the secondary market. The Polish market was
the only exception where, thanks to a more competitive primary dealer
system and application of the MTS trading platform,
12 spreads remained
Box: Turmoil in the domestic government securities markets of peripheral euro-area and CEE countries
Chart 3
Developments in the issuance of long-term
government securities in the region
10





























































































































































Hungary Poland Czech Republic RomaniaSOVEREIGN BOND ISSUANCE IN THE
CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
REGION
The impact of the financial crisis was evident in the foreign
currency bond market of emerging economies as well. While
more and more governments decided to introduce rescue
packages, which translated into an increase in financing
requirement, from September 2008 the sovereign bond
market of emerging countries practically froze up, with CDS
spreads and secondary market foreign currency bond yield
spreads soaring to record heights. In the context of extremely
unfavourable market conditions, activities related to foreign
currency-denominated bond issuance in the region were
reduced to a minimum in the period between September
2008 and March 2009 (Chart 5).
During this period only Poland and Slovakia carried out
foreign currency bond issuance in the region. The former
issued a new, five-year foreign currency-denominated bond
in January 2009 with a value of EUR 1 billion, while
following its accession to the euro area – and partly taking
advantage of the yield-reducing effect of its membership –
Slovakia implemented a smaller, secondary offering of two
previously issued series – one maturing in 2017 and the other
in 2011 – with a value of EUR 215 million and EUR 200
million, respectively.
Considering that by purchasing a sovereign government
paper and a CDS for the same country it is essentially possible
to generate a “synthetic, risk-free government bond”, foreign
currency bond spreads and CDS spreads of corresponding
maturities typically cointegrate under normal market
conditions. However, in November 2008 the two spreads
departed from one another in Central European countries: in
the periods of temporarily improved risk perception, foreign
currency spreads did not follow the decline in CDS spreads.
The underlying reason for this phenomenon may have been
the significantly increased liquidity premia observed in the
sovereign foreign currency bond market.
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narrow.
13The supply pressure exerted on the bond markets of emerging
countries in the region – which translated into multiple jumps in long-
term yields (Chart 4) – was heightened by investors’ efforts to reduce
their holdings of risky assets, and by the fact that these securities are not
listed as eligible collaterals in the liquidity-providing operations of the
ECB; in other words, they are practically unsuitable for obtaining foreign
currency financing.
In line with the turnaround in global investor sentiment, yields declined
substantially in the second and third quarters, while an increase was
observed both in the issuance amounts and the proportions of
overquoting. In most countries in the region, issuance volumes nearly
returned to the levels recorded before the default of Lehman Brothers. 
Rising yields and falling auction demand mainly characterised those
countries in the euro area where major bank rescue packages were
announced by the government. A general trend of steeply rising long-
term government bond yields was observed in the peripheral euro-area
countries
14 as well. In these countries, ten-year bond spreads relative to
German government papers have multiplied compared to their typical
pre-crisis level of under 50 basis points.
In the first quarter of 2009, differentiation occurred between euro-area
countries with a riskier reputation. Overall, yield spreads in Italy and
Spain remained unchanged, albeit with notable fluctuations, while they
continued to rise in Portugal and Greece. The latter two countries
discontinued the issuance of long-term bonds altogether, while broadly
the same volumes were offered in Spanish and Italian bond auctions as
in the previous period. From the second quarter of the year, primary
government securities markets gradually stabilised as yield spreads
dropped further. In the second quarter of 2009 Greece became the
most active sovereign issuer, followed by Spain, the United Kingdom
and France (Baba et al., 2009).
Chart 4
Developments in the 10-year yield spreads in














































































































































































































Czech Repbulic Hungary Poland Romania
13 Being more transparent and offering more efficient trading practices, the MTS system has undoubtedly contributed to this.
14 Greece, Portugal, Spain, Italy and Ireland.Parallel to the improvement of global investor sentiment,
from the spring of 2009 several emerging countries entered
the international capital markets with sovereign bond
issuance once again. It was a positive development in the
perception of the Central and Eastern European countries –
those particularly devastated by the crisis – that investors
typically quoted foreign currency bonds against sufficiently
high demand, which allowed issuers to raise the originally
planned issuance volume in several cases.
15 During this
period nearly all countries in the region were able to obtain
financing from the international capital markets once
again.
16 Following the negative net issuance recorded in the
previous two quarters, in the second quarter of 2009 the
total volume of international sovereign issuance in
emerging markets reached net USD 21 billion (Baba et al.,
2009).
Hungary issued a new, five-year foreign currency bond in
mid-July, the value of which amounted to EUR 1 billion. The
fundraising was not carried out for financing purposes, as it
was much rather intended to gauge the level of global
demand for Hungarian government paper, and to
demonstrate that the return to market financing was a
possibility. Accordingly, the successful issuance conveyed a
particularly important message and represented a milestone
in the normalisation of the government securities market.
The success of the auction demonstrated that Hungary was
capable of obtaining funds from the international capital
markets.
The high – nearly sextuple – level of overquoting and the
possibility to raise the original issuance volume from EUR
500 million to EUR 1 billion also supported the positive
assessment. The Eurobond was sold mainly to prime
institutional investors who looked at Hungarian government
bonds as long-term investments. 75 per cent of the allocation
was taken by asset managers, 13 per cent went to banks, and
the remaining 12 per cent was divided practically evenly
between insurance corporations, hedge funds
17 and other
investors. The issuance exceeded the yield of the German
government bond of the corresponding maturity by 432 basis
points, which implied an effective euro interest of around 6.8
per cent. Although this funding cost exceeded the interest on
the credit facilities provided by international institutions, the
basis of comparison should be primarily the cost of funds
available to other emerging countries in the market.
In addition to a general revival in risk appetite and timing the
issuance to a period broadly characterised by favourable
market sentiment, offering relatively high yield spreads also
contributed to the success of bonds issued in the period since
March. We may conclude with reasonable certainty that re-
entering the market was motivated not as much by the
possibility of achieving a favourable price, but rather by the
pressure of a heightened financing requirement and the
desire to generate a favourable psychological effect, i.e.
convey a positive message by a successful issuance. It has
happened numerous times that the yield of the issued bond –
measured in foreign currency – exceeded the yield of a
corresponding-maturity government paper denominated in
the domestic currency.
18
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Chart 5
Foreign currency-denominated bond issuance in the























































































































































































































































Amount of issues Number of issues (right-hand scale)
Source: Thomson Reuters, Bloomberg.
15 Since exact details about the size of the order book, and hence the extent of overquoting, are mostly unavailable, we can only offer a few examples based on the
available anecdotical market information: following an overquoting of EUR 1.2 billion, the originally planned EUR 250 million Polish Eurobond secondary offering was
raised to EUR 750 million. According to market information, the USD 2 billion Polish issuance implemented in June received bids in the amount of USD 8 billion.
According to market information, the USD 1.5 billion USD-bond issuance of Lithuania in October attracted bids in the amount of USD 1.6 billion even before the
opening of the order book.
16 As regards the broader region, the Czech Republic, Poland, Romania, Croatia, Slovakia, Slovenia and Lithuania have all issued foreign currency bonds since March
2009.
17 Investment funds that typically use high leverage.
18The yield on the five-year Eurobond issued by the Czech Republic on 29 April 2009 was 4.67 per cent, while the five-year koruna benchmark yield was around 4.5 per
cent. The yield on the ten-year USD-bond issued by Poland on 7 July 2009 – 6.4 per cent – exceeded that of the corresponding zloty-denominated government paper
by around 20 basis points.DEVELOPMENTS IN THE SOVEREIGN
BOND SPREAD AT ISSUE IN
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON
As noted above, following the escalation of the financial crisis
in autumn 2008, as a general trend less developed countries
faced substantially increased cost of funds. According to our
calculations,
19 before the collapse of Lehman Brothers the
spread of FX bonds corresponded to the CDS spread of the
issuer country in magnitude; and was comprised of, as shown
below, a constant term and the credit risk of the country as
expressed by the CDS spread:
Spread over benchmark government paper = 24.7 bp + 1.04*
*(CDS spreadissuer – CDS spreadbenchmark country)
The coefficient of the CDS spread differential does not
deviate from 1 significantly. While the value of the constant
term is not too high, it is significant. Issuance costs as well as
the volume effect may account for the excess cost. Indeed,
the bond spread at issue should include issuance costs as well
as the fees charged by banks providing bid bond coverage.
Moreover, in the CDS market – as well as in the secondary
market of FX bonds – quotes are typically related to
transactions worth EUR 5-10 million, while primary issuance
is typically carried out in the amount of EUR 0.5-2 billion.
Accordingly, in the latter case the markedly higher capital
requirement may justify excess cost of funds relative to
subsequent secondary market yields.
Examining international bond issuance following the
bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers we found that in order to
obtain substantial financing, a sovereign issuer from a less
developed market faced significantly higher costs of funds in the
international capital markets than before. In the period between
September 2008 and October 2009, the regression equation
estimating the bond spread at issue was the following:
Spread over benchmark government paper = 50 bp + 1.22*
*(CDS spreadissuer – CDS spreadbenchmark country)*
+54*dummy(EM)
While the high explanatory power of the estimate is
preserved, we can see that the factors explaining the bond
spread at issue were subject to remarkable changes during the
past one year. The main differences can be identified as
follows:
• The value of the constant term doubled; as a default, non-
developed countries had to pay a higher spread at issue in
international markets.
• The coefficient of the variable expressing the differential of
the CDS spread is significantly above 1, thus the increase in
the bond spread expected at issue exceeded that of the CDS
spread, i.e. the credit risk of the issuer country.
• The emerging market dummy variable became significant,
while its coefficient can be considered significant even from
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Chart 6
Correspondence between the CDS spread and the FX
bond spread at issue before the default of Lehman
Brothers
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19 For a detailed description of estimate, please refer to the Annex. We adjusted for global risk appetite by means of the VIX index and the EMBI Global bond spread,
and used the USD and EUR TED spreads to adjust for the liquidity tensions of financial markets; these variables, however, did not prove significant. We applied dummy
variables to demonstrate the difference between Central and Eastern European countries, broad emerging markets and peripheral euro area countries; however,
these variables did not prove significant, either.
Chart 7
Correspondence between the CDS spread and the FX
bond spread at issue after the default of Lehman
Brothers
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(over reference bond), basis pointan economic perspective. The spread payable by an
emerging market issuer is higher by 54 basis points than
that expected of a peripheral euro-area country with a
similar CDS spread, thus for these countries the constant
term, which is independent of the CDS spread, increased
by a total of 105 basis points as a result of the crisis.
In light of the changed relationship, the spread on the
Hungarian Eurobond issued in July 2009 relative to the
German government paper of corresponding maturity was
consistent with the level justified by Hungary’s CDS spread;
in fact, it was slightly below the value estimated on the basis
of the regression equation.
Changes in the impact of the explanatory factors, hence the
general increase in the spread at issue, may be justified by
several factors. First, investors’ risk sensitivity may have been
a contributing factor. The stronger differentiation between
different risk categories may have triggered a higher “jump”
in the spread both in terms of the practically “risk-free”,
developed market bonds relative to risky bonds, and in terms
of the government bonds of less developed countries relative
to those of emerging countries. The former assumption is
supported by the higher constant term, and the latter by the
changing significance of the emerging market dummy
variable. In addition, the increase in the CDS spread
differential parameter indicates that the significance of
individual differences has increased even within the same risk
categories.
Secondly, the more pronounced appearance of a certain
liquidity premium may also have contributed to the rise in
expected bond spreads. As we have shown above, the period
under review was characterised by heightened competition
for financing resources. Since the capital requirement
involved in bond purchases is significantly higher than in the
case of opening up a similar position through an interest
derivative or CDS transactions, we may assume that investors
are not willing to use the bond purchase option unless a
higher spread is paid. The higher coefficient of the CDS
spread may reflect the relative disadvantage compared to
opening up a position in a CDS transaction. In addition, this
kind of liquidity premium may also appear in the parameters
of both the constant term and the dummy variable.
The significance of the dummy variable of emerging markets
may be explained by the fact, that peripheral euro-area
countries – which do not belong to the former group – can
keep their cost of funds low also because their euro-
denominated bond issues in international markets are
executed practically in their “domestic currency”, which is
typically perceived by investors as a lower-risk exercise. In
addition, the spread at issue payable by these countries may
also be lower because of the fact that under the terms of a
CDS transaction, in case of a default the buyer may deliver to
the seller the specific country’s government bonds
denominated in any standard currency and the seller will pay
the bonds’ nominal value.
20 In other words, in case of a
default on a USD-denominated bond, the protection
provided by the CDS will cover the “domestic currency”
Eurobonds as well.
In addition, it should be noted that neither the VIX index
variable parameter, nor that of the EMBI Global bond spread
proved to be significant, and that the expected spread at issue
increased despite the fact that the majority of the bond issues
included in the sample (25 issues out of 40) was implemented
after the turnaround in risk appetite following March 2009. All
of the above suggest that in the most drastic periods of risk
aversion the issuance of FX bonds had to be limited to the
minimum, and when risk appetite was restored to the extent
that emerging markets were able to obtain external funds once
again, the crowding-out effect of developed market government
bonds contributed more to the increase in the spread at issue
than changes in the level of risk aversion. Overall, in the period
following the default of Lehman Brothers the spread at issue of
emerging market sovereign bonds increased by around 80 basis
points as a constant, while it increased, depending on credit
risk, by 20 per cent of the CDS spread differential as measured
relative to the benchmark country.
CONCLUSIONS
In our analysis we focused on bond market developments in
the period following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers,
primarily from the perspective of emerging sovereign issuers.
From September 2008 the biggest impact on investors’
government securities purchases was the drastically falling risk
appetite on the one hand, and – resulting from fiscal stimulus
packages – an increased supply of developed market
government bonds, on the other hand. These two factors
generated spectacular changes in global bond markets in terms
of the composition of issuers. In the most severe months of the
crisis bond issuance was significantly dominated by developed
countries, while those financial institutions, which had had
the largest share in issuance before, were forced to limit their
net issuance substantially. While the financing requirement of
both developed and emerging countries rose considerably, the
government bond issuance of Central and Eastern European
countries was unable to attract significant demand on the part
of investors until the turnaround in risk appetite observed in
the spring of 2009.
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20 For more details about CDS transactions and the CDS market, see Varga (2009).Developments both in domestic currency government paper
and foreign currency bonds reflected the drastic decline in
the financing opportunities of emerging countries. In
domestic markets, the market turmoil translated into rising
yields, weak auction demand, failed auctions, low issuance
volumes and a shift to short-term government paper.
Negative trends were even more evident in the case of
international issuance: in the most severe period of the crisis
emerging countries were practically driven out of this market.
The turmoil did not spare less developed euro-area countries
either: they were also hit by similar market turbulences, albeit
to a much lesser degree and less severely.
The recovering risk appetite observed from March 2009 led
to a significant improvement even in emerging government
securities markets, with a rebound in the Central and Eastern
European sovereign bond market as well. At the same time,
the cost of funds for emerging countries has clearly increased
relative to both their own earlier spreads and to developed
market bonds, despite the substantial demand for the
government paper issued by them, which may suggest that
the current fierce competition for financing resources will
continue over the long term.
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ANNEX: REGRESSION ESTIMATE OF
FOREIGN CURRENCY BOND SPREADS AT
ISSUE
We applied the OLS method to perform a regression
estimate for the sovereign foreign currency bond spread at
issue. In the regression equation we used the difference
between the issuer country’s CDS spread and that of the
benchmark country to estimate the yield over benchmark
government bonds of corresponding maturity. We adjusted
for global risk appetite by means of the VIX index and the
EMBI Global bond spread, and used the USD and EUR
TED spreads to adjust for the liquidity tensions of financial
markets. We applied dummy variables to demonstrate the
difference between Central and Eastern European
countries, broad emerging markets and peripheral euro
area countries. We estimated the following regression
equation:
where spreadi indicates the yield spread of the ith FX issue
compared to the benchmark government paper of the
corresponding maturity (the German Bund, the US T-bond,
etc.); CDSi is the difference between the CDS spread of the
issuer country and that of the benchmark country; VIX is the
implied volatility of the S&P 500 index; EMBI is the value of
the EMBI Global bond spread; TED is the difference between
the 3-month developed interbank market and government
securities market yields. If the issuer is a Central or Eastern
European country or an emerging country, the value of
DummyCEE/EM is 1, otherwise it is 0.
The analysis covered the issues of 17 countries, including the
countries of the Central and Eastern European region (the
Czech Republic, Croatia, Poland, Lithuania, Latvia,
Hungary, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia), and the
international issues of other emerging markets (Brazil, South
Africa, Israel, Turkey) and peripheral euro-area countries
(Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain).
As we examined the international bond issuance of the above
countries before the default of Lehman Brothers, we focused
on the period between 1 January 2006 and 15 September
2008. The sample included 47 issues; the results are
summarised in Table 3.
i i VIX CDS Spread β β α+ + + + = 2 1 * *
i EM CEE Dummy TED EMBI ε β β β+ + + / 5 4 3 * * * +
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is highly significant (even at 99 per cent significance level), but
we have to reject the significance of the coefficient of the other
variables. The explanatory power of the estimate is remarkably
high; the bond spread at issue was essentially determined by the
value of the CDS spread in this period.
As we examined the bond issuance of the 17 countries
specified above after the default of Lehman Brothers, we
focused on the period between 16 September 2008 and 10
October 2009. The sample included 40 elements; the results
are summarised in Table 4.
In addition to the constant term and the CDS spread
differential, the coefficient of the emerging market dummy
variable has also become significant. The dummy variable for
the CEE region was significant in itself, as well, but the value
of its coefficient was identical in magnitude with that of the
emerging market dummy variable.
In the period following the collapse of Lehman Brothers,
several countries from the Central and Eastern European
region had to rely on the assistance of the IMF or other
supranational institutions. International rescue packages
allowed these countries to reduce the size of their market
financing. The relatively solid financing background and the
lack of a reliance on bond issuance may have affected the
bond spread at issue as well, thus we also performed the
estimate adjusted for the international rescue packages. We
applied two dummy variables. The value of dummy(IMF1) is
1 if a stand-by arrangement exists (Hungary, Romania); and
the value of dummy(IMF2) is 1 if a stand-by arrangement or
a flexible credit line exists (Hungary, Romania, Poland);
otherwise their value is 0. The estimate results are
summarised by Table 5.
It is evident that the availability of an IMF rescue package did
not significantly change the bond spread at issue;
incorporating the variables did not alter the previous results.
Although we estimated several estimate specifications in
analysing the relationships, this did not change our findings
significantly, thus it did not essentially affect our
conclusions.
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* indicates significant parameters at 95 per cent significance level. 
Constant Difference VIX EMBI TED dummy(EM) dummy(CEE) R
2 (adj)
in CDS spreads
24.7* 1.04* –1.74 –0.11 0.44 12.96 –8.93
0.87
(4.24) (17.73) (–1.13) (–0.72) (–0.30) (1.19) (–0.96)
Table 3
Estimate results for the period preceding the default of Lehman Brothers
* indicates significant parameters at 95 per cent significance level. 
Constant Difference VIX EMBI TED dummy(EM) dummy(CEE) R
2 (adj)
in CDS spreads
50* 1.22* –0.32 0.15 –0.1 54* 34
0.86
(2.98) (14.38) (-0.09) (0.7) (–0.30) (2.58) (1.66)
Table 4
Estimate results for the period following the default of Lehman Brothers
* indicates significant parameters at 95 per cent significance level. 
Constant Difference in VIX EMBI TED dummy(EM) dummy(CEE) dummy(IMF1) dummy(IMF2) R
2 (adj)
CDS spreads
47.7 1.20* –4.91 0.31 0.23 54 29 –58.7 –18.6
0.86
(2.98) (14.37) (–1.50) (1.35) (0.67) (2.78) (1.57) (–1.14) (–0.56)
Table 5
Estimate results for the period following the default of Lehman Brothers with IMF dummy